Post-judgment supersedeas bonds are not the sexiest part of high-stakes civil litigation, but bond costs are increasingly important as jury verdicts continue to climb. Advising defense clients about the cost of “bonding out” after a potential adverse ruling should be included in discussions about the costs of litigation. In the Texas Supreme Court opinion In re Development & Construction, LP, No. 24-0293, 2026 WL 1445481 (Tex. May 22, 2026), the Court highlighted the importance of this issue in catastrophic claims with the potential for large judgments.
On June 9, 2019, a crane collapsed during a storm in Dallas and struck an apartment building. The incident led to the death of a woman, and her parents sued a variety of defendants allegedly responsible. After a jury trial, the trial court judge signed a judgment holding three of the defendants – referred to as the “Greystar Entities” – jointly and severally liable for over $360 million in compensatory damages. The Greystar Entities filed a $25 million “joint” supersedeas bond predicated on the supersedeas bond cap codified in the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. The Plaintiffs moved for review of the bond and argued that the bond should be vacated because the $25 million bond cap should be applied to each of the Greystar Entities individually. The trial court agreed with Plaintiffs and ordered “[u]nless and until Defendants file individual bonds and/or identify which Defendant the current bond shall apply to, no valid bond is in place.” The Greystar Entities filed a notice designating the bond as applicable to one of the three entities and promptly filed a motion for appellate review. The Dallas Court of Appeals reviewed the matter and affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
The Greystar Entities filed a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court of Texas. The Court began its analysis by discussing the procedures available to a judgment debtor to delay execution and enforcement of a judgment. All such procedures, according to the Court, are specific to the judgment debtor who seeks to delay such execution and enforcement. Against this background, the Court explained that the rules regarding a supersedeas bond should also be specific to each judgment debtor.
After discussing the history of the amount of security required to supersede a judgment, the Court turned its attention to Section 52.006(b)(2) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code. That provision provides as follows: “Notwithstanding any other law or rule of court, when a judgment is for money, the amount of security must not exceed the lesser of (1) 50 percent of the judgment debtor’s net worth; or (2) $25 million.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 52.006(b)(2).
The Court adopted Plaintiffs’ interpretation that this statute provides a $25 million cap as the maximum amount of security that can be required for a judgment debtor to suspend execution of a judgment. The Greystar Entities’ argument that the $25 million cap is the maximum amount of security that can be required for any money judgment, regardless of how many judgment debtors exist, was unpersuasive. The Court focused on the definition of “security” in the statutory scheme: “a bond or deposit posted … by a judgment debtor to suspend execution of the judgment.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 52.001. Summarizing the statute at issue, the Court explained that a supersedeas bond posted by a debtor must not exceed the lesser of 50% of the debtor’s net worth or $25 million. This analysis is performed for each judgment debtor, even if the judgment is entered against multiple parties.
After dismissing Greystar Entities’ alternative arguments, the Court discussed how this per-debtor cap “allows trial courts to apply the statute without additional court-crafted policy overlays” and explained that adopting the Greystar Entities’ interpretation would lead to unintended and disfavored consequences. For example, if the $25 million cap applied to judgments generally and not judgment debtors specifically, one judgment debtor posting a $25 million supersedeas bond would stay execution of the judgment against another judgment debtor that may not even be taking an appeal. Taken to its further extreme, an insolvent debtor could post a $1 bond (which would be half its net worth) and stay execution against all other judgment debtors.
Finally, the Court did not find any compelling policy reason to favor the Greystar Entities’ interpretation of the cap applying collectively to all judgment debtors. While adopting such an interpretation would make it cheaper to appeal a judgment with multiple debtors, such a policy is not so compelling as to override the strict rule that statutory text must be given its plain meaning. There are also numerous other statutory provisions which already make supersedeas more easily available than requiring a judgment debtor to issue security in the entire amount of the judgment. The Court refused to undertake linguistic gymnastics for the sake of making supersedeas cheaper when doing so would undermine the plain language of the statute.
The Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the joint bond was insufficient as to two of the three Greystar Entities. However, as somewhat of a technical aside, the Court also found that the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing a reasonable time for the Greystar Entities to comply with the ruling before facing execution of the judgment. The Court advised that the trial court should grant the Greystar Entities the reasonable time of twenty days to fix the insufficient bond. Based on the Court’s opinion, doing so required each of the Greystar Entities to post a separate $25 million supersedeas bond, resulting in bonds totaling $75 million.